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INTRODUCTION
In our adversarial legal system, the common law is most often
shaped by disputes involving parties that want different outcomes.
Rarely do parties spend the time and resources to litigate because they
want the same outcome. However, special education law involves such
a common desire—providing students with disabilities an appropriate
education. 1 In this area, litigation often arises because of
disagreements over what methods will best achieve that common
desire, not over the ultimate outcome.
In 1976, Congress enacted what is today the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act 2 (IDEA) under its Spending Clause 3
powers. Its purpose is to provide students with disabilities a
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Ohio State University.
1
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006); Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S.
Ct. 2484, 2494 (2009).
2
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1491 (2006).
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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meaningful education 4 by requiring states receiving federal funding
for special education to provide all eligible students with a “free and
appropriate public education” 5 (FAPE) in the “least restrictive
environment” 6 (LRE). Restrictiveness is defined as the degree to
which the student with a disability interacts with others who do not
have disabilities. 7 These provisions standing alone, however, do not
provide much guidance for the states or their school districts.
Yet it is likely that Congress intended to use such generalized
language because the IDEA’s focus is on individual students. The
Supreme Court recognized that the IDEA requires states receiving
federal assistance to educate children with many different kinds of
disabilities. 8 Moreover, benefits for one child “at one end of the
spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at
the other end, with infinite variations in between.” 9 Because there is so
much variance involved with the IDEA, Congress likely anticipated a
high degree of litigation as parties disagreed over how the vague
provisions applied to their individual situations. The dispute resolution
process that the IDEA mandates also evidences this anticipation. 10 The
IDEA mandates mediation and the exhaustion of state-level
administrative hearing processes prior to bringing action in federal
court. 11 These provisions, together with the IDEA’s focus on
individual students, indicate that Congress intended the IDEA to be
ambiguous.
When those disputes reach the judiciary, the courts of appeals
have responded in different ways. Specifically, the appeals courts
disagree over what constitutes an LRE. For instance, the Fifth Circuit
engages in a two-part balancing test, asking whether a child can be
4

Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. High Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 180 (1982).
5
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006).
6
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006).
7
Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Charles W., 81 F. App’x 843, 847 (5th Cir.
2003).
8
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982).
9
Id.
10
See infra pp. 20–22.
11
Id.
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educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom, and if not, whether the
child has been “mainstreamed” 12 to the maximum extent
appropriate. 13 The Sixth Circuit’s test directs reviewing courts in its
ambit to consider whether the supplementary services offered in a
segregated setting could be equally offered in a general education
environment. 14 The Ninth Circuit’s test incorporates the Sixth
Circuit’s approach into a four-factor test, requiring its lower courts to
(1) compare the benefits in the general education environment with
those in the segregated setting; (2) consider the non-academic benefits
of placement in the general education environment; (3) consider the
impact of the student’s placement in the general education
environment on the teacher and students without disabilities; and (4)
consider the cost of the supplementary services that are needed for the
student to be placed in the general education environment. 15 The Third
Circuit adopts the Fifth Circuit’s test and adds three factors to the first
part of the test. 16 The Seventh Circuit’s test asks whether the student
with a disability received a satisfactory education in the general
education environment, and if not, whether “reasonable measures”
would have made it satisfactory. 17
The Department of Education’s regulations have fleshed out
the LRE requirement to some extent. It requires for a “continuum” of
arrangements that range from total inclusion in a general education
classroom to placement in an institutional environment. 18 The IDEA
12

“Mainstreaming” is an educational term that refers to the placement of a
student with a disability in a regular education environment with appropriate
instructional support. Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Is the Era of Judicially-Ordered
Inclusion Over? 114 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1011, 1017 (1997). LRE is not
synonymous with mainstreaming because placement in a regular education
environment is inappropriate for some students with disabilities. Id.
13
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989).
14
Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
15
Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398,
1400–01 (9th Cir. 1994).
16
Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d
1204, 1217–18 (3d Cir. 1993). See discussion infra Part III.B.
17
Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 277
(7th Cir. 2007). See discussion infra Part III.A.
18
34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2009).

583

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

3

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 2

Spring 2010

requires that school boards place students with disabilities in a setting
that will involve as much interaction with nondisabled peers “to the
maximum extent appropriate.” 19 Yet how the appeals courts determine
what placement on that continuum is most appropriate is accomplished
in starkly different ways.
Though different appeals courts apply their own respective
tests, there are essentially two types: factor-based tests and
reasonableness tests. The majority of circuits employ a factor-based
test, while only the Seventh Circuit employs a reasonableness test.
Both purport to better realize congressional intent, yet the former
requires the projection of judicial review into classrooms, while the
latter is much more deferential and uses a less exacting form of
scrutiny. Cases with similar facts, therefore, can reach different
outcomes. 20 This difference in outcomes, when based on the same
facts, must mean that one of these tests is misapplying the substantive
provisions of the IDEA.
This Note contends that the reasonableness test better achieves
congressional intent. It compares the Seventh Circuit’s reasonableness
test from Board of Education v. Ross 21 with the Third Circuit’s factor
test from Oberti v. Board of Education 22 . 23 By examining the
language of the IDEA and the limited Supreme Court precedent that
has affected LRE interpretation, this Note argues for the abandonment
of the factor tests that intrusively scrutinize school board decisions and
the findings of state-level adjudicatory bodies set up under the IDEA.
Courts should abandon the Oberti-type test because neither the
language of the IDEA nor the relevant Supreme Court precedent
19

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
See infra Part IV.
21
Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267 (7th
Cir. 2007).
22
Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d
1204, 1217–18 (3d Cir. 1993).
23
Of the different factor tests, Oberti is the prime example because it has been
credited with starting the “era” of judicial intrusion upon placement decisions by
school boards. Osborne, Jr., supra note 12, at 1017. Therefore, it serves as a
satisfactory representative of the different factor tests used by the relevant appeals
courts.
20
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presumes that a student with a disability should be included in a
general education environment. In addition, this Note will examine a
United States district court case applying the Third Circuit’s factorbased test, and then will apply the Seventh Circuit’s reasonableness
test to that case’s facts. By comparing the different outcomes, this
Note argues that the outcome of the latter test better achieves
congressional intent of providing all students with disabilities an
education that is appropriate to their “unique needs,” 24 especially in
light of Supreme Court precedent and studies examining the effects on
students with disabilities when they are misplaced in general education
environments.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA
Neither the federal government nor any state government
provided meaningful educational service to disabled children until
fairly recently. Before that time, people with disabilities were
neglected and deprived of basic rights. In 1927, in the face of an equal
protection challenge, the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell upheld a
Virginia act providing for the sterilization of people with disabilities.
25
The act recited “that the health of the patient and the welfare of
society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental
defectives.” 26 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes rationalized the
holding: “ . . . [I]n order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence . . . [i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.” 27 At least thirty states endorsed disparate
24

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) (2006).
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). While this case has not been overruled, such a
statute probably would not withstand present constitutional muster. The Buck Court
employed rational basis review. In light of Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942), which recognized that procreation is a fundamental right, the
statute at issue in Buck would fail strict scrutiny.
26
Buck, 274 U.S. at 205.
27
Id. at 207.
25
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treatment of people with disabilities, having at one time or another
permitted their involuntary sterilization. 28 That a majority of states has
at one time or another provided for this constitutional violation
indicates the hardship and prejudice that people with disabilities have
faced during this nation’s history.
Another indication of this prejudice is that no state provided
meaningful access to public schools until 1911, when New Jersey
became the first state to provide special education classes. 29 Before
that, disabled children were largely left out of the educational
environment entirely. During the nineteenth century, transportation to
school was on horseback or on foot, imposing prohibitive hardships
for those who were immobile or severely mentally disabled.30 Before
the Civil War, “parents and officials often hid children” who would
now be classified as entitled to special education services in “attics or
poorhouses.” 31 After the Civil War, many communities began
adopting compulsory education laws. 32 Those children who suffered
from less severe disabilities than those who could not travel did gain
some access to formal education. 33 However, educators separated
these children from the regular education environment, sometimes by
creating separate classrooms or even separate schools. 34 Such
classification lacked any precision, and these students would be
labeled simply as “deaf,” “feebleminded,” or “crippled.” 35
During the Progressive era, some cities began to recognize the
educational needs of people with disabilities. Chicago, Boston, and
28

Center for Individual Freedom,
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/current/in_our_opinion/un_sterile_past.html
(last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
29
Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal
Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a “Suspect Class” Under
the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 873 (1975).
30
Id. at 871.
31
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 29 (1990).
32
Id.
33
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 29, at 871.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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Providence provided special classes for the mentally retarded in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 36 Yet accommodations
did not improve much until the 1920s, with classrooms for the
mentally disabled coming into existence. 37 Even still, those who did
not show any progress in those programs were deemed “uneducable”
and excluded from public schooling. 38 Lacking any individual
assessments, determinations of whether to include or exclude a
disabled child from public schooling were based on intelligence
tests. 39 Such overbroad, generalized mechanisms of assessment failed
to appreciate the complex and unique needs of any particular student
afflicted with a mental disability.
As recently as the 1960s, no state provided formal services for
children with disabilities. 40 Many states continued to exclude students
with disabilities. 41 Those that were included were often put in
programs that were inappropriate for their respective needs. 42 Students
with physical disabilities were placed in programs with students who
suffered from mental disabilities. 43 In 1974, roughly one million
children were entirely excluded from the public schools because of
some disability. 44 It was also estimated that of the nearly six million
children who were disabled and were attending public schools, half
were probably receiving no special education services. 45 Parents of the
disabled began to push their respective states to address this neglect
and were met with some success. 46 Responding to parents’ efforts,
some states passed laws providing for partial funding and required
36

Id. at 873.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Edwin W. Martin et al., The Legislative and Litigation History of Special
Education, 6 FUTURE OF CHILD. 25, 25, 27 (1996).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 789, 803 (2006).
45
Id.
46
Martin et al., supra note 38, at 27.
37
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school boards to offer special educational services to children with
disabilities. 47 However, many laws were not enforced, or the funds
themselves proved to be woefully insufficient. 48
Because of the unresponsiveness of the states, parents turned to
the federal courts and to Congress. Two landmark cases, one coming
out of Pennsylvania and the other out of the District of Columbia,
provided the basis for what would become the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act that we have today. The first, Pennsylvania
Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, was
initiated by PARC and the parents of thirteen mentally disabled
children for the children’s exclusion from public schools. 49 The
plaintiffs argued that the denial of a public education to children with
mental retardation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 50 They presented expert testimony to show
that students with mental disabilities “are capable of benefiting from a
program of education and training.”51 Because Pennsylvania had
provided a free education, it could not deny students with disabilities
access to a meaningful education. 52 The plaintiffs submitted a consent
agreement to which the state agreed. 53 The agreement provided that
“‘[e]very retarded person between the ages of six and twenty-one
years . . . shall be provided access to a free public program of
education and training appropriate to his capacities as soon as
possible.’” 54 The district court approved the agreement and adopted it
as a decree, avoiding the constitutional question. 55 This decree created
the contours of the IDEA’s FAPE and LRE provisions.
In the other landmark case, from the District of Columbia, the
district court reached the constitutional questions raised by the
plaintiffs. In Mills v. Board of Education, the parents of poor minority
47

Id. at 28.
Id.
49
334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
50
Id. at 1258; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
51
334 F. Supp. at 1259.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1266.
55
Id. at 1266–67.
48
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students with mental disabilities brought a class action lawsuit against
the Board of Education of the District of Columbia for denying them a
free public education. 56 Citing Brown v. Board of Education I 57 and
Bolling v. Sharpe 58 , the district court rejected the Board of
Education’s argument that it did not have sufficient funding to provide
for disabled children. 59 “Constitutional rights must be afforded
citizens despite the greater expense involved.” 60
While Congress was prompted by these cases to pass
legislation that would fundamentally change the public school
environment, it had been involved with public schools before, albeit
for reasons different from the preservation of constitutional rights. For
instance, in 1958, Congress passed the National Defense Education
Act (NDEA), in response to the Soviet Union’s outer space success
with the launch of Sputnik-1 in September of 1957. 61 NDEA sought to
improve science and math aptitude in the elementary grades. 62 This act
began federal involvement in public schools at the elementary and
secondary educational levels. 63 But it was not until after PARC and
Mills that Congress passed legislation that enforced the newly
recognized rights to a free public education for students with
disabilities. 64
In 1965, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA), 65 the predecessor to the No Child Left Behind

56

348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972).
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
58
347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying the Brown I rationale to the District of
Columbia through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
59
Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874–76.
60
Id. at 876.
61
Martin et al, supra note 40, at 26.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 548 U.S.
176, 194 (1982).
65
20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7641 (2006).
57
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Act (NCLB). 66 This act was significant because it marked the first
time that Congress directly subsidized services to specified classes of
students. 67 As part of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society
policies, ESEA gave the federal government a new role in shaping
educational policies. 68 It was intended to compel school districts to
treat “disadvantaged students” more equally. 69 One scholar argues that
the ESEA was a consequence of a “compensatory” 70 federal
government, where government officials enacted policies based on the
understanding that “the state could manage the economy and mitigate
the social outcomes of the market without directly intervening in the
operation of the marketplace.” 71 The Johnson administration saw the
state as a tool for combating poverty, and it considered education as an
important factor in whether one could overcome poverty. 72 The ESEA
was one of many different policies the administration wielded in its
“war on poverty,” and combating that war was ESEA’s main
purpose. 73 Though the Act did not specify students with disabilities,
the same Congress amended Title I of the ESEA to include them. 74
Title VI created an incentive for states to develop educational
programs that benefited students with disabilities. 75 However, it did

66

In 2002, Congress amended the ESEA and reauthorized it as the NCLB.
NCLB imposes upon States greater accountability to meet state academic standards,
gauged through state testing systems, that meet federal requirements. See, e.g.,
STATE OF WASHINGTON OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,
http://www.k12.wa.us/esea/ (last visited April 28, 2010).
67
Martin et al., supra note 40, at 27.
68
Harvey Kantor, Education, Social Reform, and the State: ESEA and Federal
Education Policy in the 1960s, 100 AM. J. EDUC. 47, 49 (1991).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 56.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 58.
73
Id. at 60.
74
Martin et al., supra note 40, at 27.
75
School Vouchers and Students with Disabilities, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/pdf/vouchers.pdf (last
visited Apr. 18, 2010).
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not include any specific mandates that would condition the receipt of
funding. 76
Five years later, Congress replaced the amendment with the
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), 77 which replaced Title VI
of the ESEA. 78 Like its predecessor, EHA did not specify how states
had to spend federal funds. 79 Instead, it consolidated existing federal
programs and established the Bureau of Education of the Handicapped
within the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 80 Part
B of the EHA was designed to help states begin special education
programs, or expand and improve upon existing ones. 81 But without
specific mandates, it did not significantly improve the existing
conditions for students with disabilities. 82
In 1973, Congress passed the nondiscrimination Rehabilitation
Act. § 504 prohibits discrimination against “otherwise qualified”
people with disabilities for employment in federally funded activities
and programs. 83 The Rehabilitation Act was enacted to help provide
employment opportunities to people with mental and physical
disabilities. 84 In doing so, it became the “major federal mechanism . . .
for statutory relief from employment discrimination.” 85 But it did not
contain any monitoring function, nor did it include any funding
itself. 86 Thus, for twenty years § 504 “was virtually ignored by local
and state educational agencies.” 87 Additionally, § 504 applied only to
programs or buildings that received federal funding. 88 It would not be
76

Id.
Id.
78
Colker, supra note 44, at 803.
79
National Council on Disability, supra note 76.
80
Colker, supra note 44, at 803.
81
Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 548 U.S.
176, 180 (1982).
82
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 76.
83
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).
84
Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Analyzing Employment
Discrimination Claims, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 867, 868 (1984).
85
Id. at 869.
86
Martin et al., supra note 40, at 29.
87
Id.
88
Id.
77

591

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

11

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 2

Spring 2010

until 1990, with the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), that discriminatory practices or policies against people with
disabilities would be outlawed in employment, public
accommodations, transportation, and telecommunications, regardless
of any federal funding. 89 The ADA’s scope includes public schools,
and together with § 504, they provide a frequent basis for alternative
remedies to the IDEA. 90
Two years later, however, after Mills and PARC expressly
recognized the right of students with disabilities to a free and
appropriate public education under the Equal Protection Clause,
Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHCA) 91 . The Supreme Court described the EAHCA in Smith v.
Robinson as a “comprehensive scheme . . . to aid the States in
complying with their constitutional obligations to provide public
education for handicapped children.” 92 It established the requirement
that states receiving federal funds for special education, as well as
their school boards, provide a free and appropriate public education 93
to a student with a disability in the least restrictive environment. 94
First, however, states had to identify which students were in need of
special education service. 95 To do so, school boards had to perform
evaluations to assess the impact that a student’s disability had on his
education. 96 Once a child was identified as disabled and in need of
service, the school board had to develop and maintain an
89

Id.
Id.
91
The EAHCA has assumed different titles. It is also commonly referred to as
Public Law 94–142. In addition, it is sometimes confusingly referred to as the
Education for the Handicapped Act, or EHA, sharing the same title as the EHA that
the ESEA was amended to include. The Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson, 468
U.S. 992 (1984), referred to the EAHCA as the EHA. Id. at 994. But the two acts are
not the same. For clarity purposes, this Note keeps the titles distinct.
92
468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984)
93
Trent D. Nelson, Comment and Note, Congressional Attention Needed for
the “Stay-Put” Provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 1997
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 49, 49 (1997).
94
Martin et al., supra note 40, at 30.
95
Id.
96
Id.
90
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individualized education program (IEP). 97 The IEP had to be carried
out in the least restrictive environment. 98 The EAHCA was
reauthorized in 1990 as the IDEA. 99 The 1990 amendments made little
substantive changes. 100 For instance, it substituted all references to
“handicap” with the term “disability.” 101 It also replaced “disabled
children” with “children with disabilities.” 102 Mandates regarding
FAPE and LRE were largely unaffected. 103
All fifty states now receive federal financial assistance under
the IDEA. 104 Since the IDEA became effective in 1976, the percentage
of special-education students ages six through twenty-one has
increased substantially. Between 1976 and 1994, this group increased
from 23.8 percent to 51.1 percent of all students with disabilities. 105
During the 1993-94 school year, 4,786,065 students ages six through
twenty-one received services under the IDEA. 106 That translates to 8.1
percent of the general population. 107 As of 2004, the same age group
increased in number to 6,033,425. 108 The increase between 1993 and

97

See discussion infra Part II.
Martin et al., supra note 40, at 30.
99
Matthew J. Schaefer, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: “Related
Services” Versus “Medical Services?”[Cedar Rapids Community School District v.
Garret F., 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999)], 39 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 147 (1999).
100
Id.
101
Dixie Snow Huefner, Revisiting Congress’ New IDEA in Special Education,
1993 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 170, 172 n.11 (1993)
102
Id.
103
Schaefer, supra note 100, at 147.
104
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 1 27TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, 2005 28
(2005), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2005/parts-bc/27th-vol-1.pdf.
105
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (1995),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/OSEP95AnlRpt/ch1b.html.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 1 28TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 39 (2006),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2006/parts-b-c/28th-vol98
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2004 represented a full one percent of the general population, to 9.2
percent. 109
Since the 1960s, people with disabilities have come a long
way. For the entire nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth,
people with disabilities were neglected and ignored. Those that were
given access to public schools did not receive the personalized
attention necessary for a meaningful education. 110 The IDEA was
passed in recognition of this nationwide failure. 111 Today, students
with disabilities, along with their parents, 112 have enforceable rights
that ensure at least an opportunity for a meaningful education, based
on the unique needs of each of those students.
II. THE IDEA’S STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS
A student’s “individualized education plan” (IEP) 113
determines the appropriateness of her education and the restrictiveness
of her education environment. 114 Practically, this plan serves as the
basis for the child’s education and placement. 115 The different
provisions are meant to ensure that the unique needs of each child are
identified and appropriately addressed. 116
Therefore, the IEP is a critical component of the education of
the child with a disability. 117 When creating a program, the first step is
1.pdf. This report is the most recent available report published by the Department of
Education.
109
Id.
110
See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 548
U.S. 176, 179 (1982).
111
Id.
112
See Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007).
113
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4) (2006).
114
20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
115
See Heather J. Russell, Note, Florence County School District Four v.
Carter: A Good “IDEA”; Suggestions for Implementing the Carter Decision and
Improving the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1479,
1485–86 (1996).
116
See id.
117
Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons from Special
Education Legislation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 774 (2001).
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evaluating the child’s needs. 118 This evaluation cannot rely on any one
criterion. It must be based on “a variety of assessment tools and
strategies” used to compile “relevant functional, developmental, and
academic information.” 119 In fact, § 1414 of the IDEA provides strict
requirements when evaluating a student, from ensuring that the
evaluation is not racially or culturally discriminatory to employing
trained professionals who can competently administer the
evaluation. 120 Multiple persons, known as the “[i]ndividualized
education program team” (IEP team) conduct the evaluation. 121 A
student’s IEP team consists of the student’s parents, at least one
regular education teacher, at least one special education teacher, a
representative of the school board, 122 someone who can interpret the
implications of the results on instruction in the classroom, any other
individuals the parents or school board may deem necessary to attend,
and, when possible, the student. 123 There must be parental consent to
the evaluation. 124 For an initial evaluation, if the parent does not
consent or respond to a request for an evaluation, the school board can
institute an evaluation under § 1415. 125 However, services cannot be
provided without consent from the parent or the student. 126 After the
evaluation is complete, the IEP team determines whether the child is
disabled within the meaning of § 1401(3). 127

118

20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i)(II) (2006).
20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A) (2006).
120
20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b)(3)(A)(i), (iv) (2006).
121
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2006).
122
This representative must meet three criteria: (1) he must be “qualified to
provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the
unique needs of children with disabilities”; (2) he must be “knowledgeable about the
general education curriculum”; and (3) he must be “knowledgeable about the
availability of resources of the local educational agency.” 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(iv)(I)–(III) (2006).
123
20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(i)–(vii) (2006).
124
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (2006).
125
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I) (2006).
126
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(II) (2006).
127
20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4)(A) (2006).
119
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Upon the determination that the child is disabled and in need of
special services, an IEP is prepared. 128 Pursuant to § 1414(a)(C)(i)(I),
that determination is made in reference to § 1401, which defines a
“child with a disability” as a child
with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual
impairments (including blindness), serious emotional
disturbance (referred to in this chapter as “emotional
disturbance”), orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or
specific learning disabilities; and . . . who, by reason
thereof, needs special education and related services. 129
For children ages three through nine, this definition can include
children who “experienc[e] developmental delays” in at least one of
the following areas: “physical development; cognitive development;
communication development; social or emotional development; or
adaptive development.” 130
Once a child is determined to be disabled, his individualized
education program is created. 131 It includes statements of the child’s
current educational level of performance, annual goals for the child,
the educational services the child needs, and how much the student
will participate in regular educational programs. 132 These statements
all strive to offer the student an appropriate education in the least
restrictive environment, and they are tailored to that student’s unique
habits and needs. 133 For instance, the statements concerning the extent
to which the student will participate in regular education programs
would be directly pursuant to the least restrictive environment. By no
128

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006).
130
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B)(i) (2006).
131
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006).
132
34 C.F.R. § 300.324 (2009); see also Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough
of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213 n.16 (3d Cir. 1993).
133
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(iv)(I) (2006).
129
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means does it create a presumption for mainstreaming. Its very title,
“Individualized Education Program,” 134 is itself a good enough
indication that there are no places for presumptions when interpreting
the IDEA. Presumptions fail to account for the unique challenges of
each disability. If the evaluation and the IEP team determine that the
student’s educational needs are better served entirely away from the
regular classroom, that is entirely consistent with the IDEA.
The IDEA creates a “preference” for placing students with
disabilities among their peers who do not have disabilities. 135 Pursuant
to that preference, school boards must provide a continuum of
placement alternatives to the general educational environment. 136
These alternatives recognize the individual nature of education, as they
account for the varying needs of students with disabilities. The IDEA
requires this continuum by providing that “[t]o the maximum extent
appropriate, . . . [the student with a disability is] educated with
children who are not disabled.” 137 This language recognizes that there
are “infinite variations” 138 of appropriateness. For one student,
attending a general education classroom with the aid of supplementary
134

20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2006) (emphasis added).
Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 181 n.4 (1982).
136
34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2009); but see N.W. ex rel. A.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch.
Dist., 813 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court holding that a school
board was not required to create a new room designed for the specific needs of the
student with a disability, even though the school board did not have a developed
special education program, because a lack of funds prohibited placing a specially
trained teacher in the student’s school without reducing the educational benefits
provided to other handicapped students); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (including cost of placement as a
factor in determining whether a school board properly placed a student with a
disability). Engaging in a cost analysis when determining whether a school board has
failed to comply with the IDEA is not expressly provided for in the IDEA itself.
Whether this approach is prudent in such an analysis is beyond the scope of this
Note.
137
20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
138
34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(1)(i) (2009) provides placement examples of what
may suffice for meeting the “unique needs of a child with a disability” when
providing him or her with a special education.
135
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aid may be what is appropriate to the maximum extent. For another,
the general educational environment may exceed the appropriateness
for educational benefit, and the student may need to spend the full day
in a segregated classroom. For still another, “reverse
mainstreaming,” 139 where students who do not have disabilities spend
parts of their days in a segregated setting with students who have
disabilities, may be what is most appropriate. The suitability of the
placement is meant to be determined by an array of considerations,
which are outlined by regulations promulgated by the Department of
Education. 140 These regulations seek to achieve the most suitable
environment in which the individual student can be given an
appropriate education reserved for by the IDEA. 141
Pursuant to achieving a suitable environment, and given a
preference for mainstreaming, a student can be removed from the
regular educational environment only when the disability “is such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” 142 Therefore, even when
taking a student with disabilities out of the general educational
environment, the school board is required to consider which placement
on the continuum of alternatives is most suitable to ensure that she is
being educated with her nondisabled peers “to the maximum extent
appropriate.” 143 Additionally, the school board must give preference to

139

See Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 2002).
See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.114–120 (2009).
141
34 C.F.R. § 300.116(a) (2009) provides that the decision is made by the
parents, people “knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of the evaluation data,
and the placement options.” The placement decision must be based on the child’s
IEP and as close as possible to the student’s home, unless the IEP requires an
arrangement that the school that she would normally attend cannot provide. 34
C.F.R. §§ 300.116(b)–(c). Attention must be paid to any “potential harmful effect on
the child or on the quality of services” that may be needed. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(d).
The need to modify curriculum to accommodate a student who is disabled is not a
valid justification for the student’s removal from the general educational
environment. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(e).
142
34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(ii) (2009).
143
34 C.F.R. § 300.115(b)(1) (2009).
140
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the school that the student with disabilities would attend if he did not
have such disabilities. 144
Through such strict rules and regulations, the IDEA ensures
that parents are active in the education of the student. The IDEA’s
“extensive procedural requirements” ensure this participation. 145 First,
when making the initial evaluation of students to determine whether
they need IDEA service, the parents must consent. 146 Second, after an
evaluation has been made, parents can still seek a reevaluation if they
disagree with the evaluation conducted by the school board. 147 Third,
after the IEP is created, the parents must be notified of any proposed
change or of any refusal by the school board to initiate a change. 148
Fourth, before the student is placed in a special education program,
parents must again give consent. 149 Fifth, in the drafting of the IEP,
the school board must give the parents “[a]n opportunity . . . to
examine all records . . . and to participate in meetings with respect to
the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the
child.” 150 If there is disagreement about the child’s placement, there
are multiple avenues for dispute resolution that the IDEA requires the
states to create. 151 This system of dispute resolution has many
different levels, from mediation 152 up to filing with a federal district
court. 153 These different procedures require that the state ensure that
parents are involved. If the parents refuse to get involved, or if the
children are wards of the state, then surrogates will be appointed. 154
144

34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)(3) (2009). This preference for placement at the
student’s neighborhood school is based on the requirement that a placement be made
as close to the student’s home as possible.
145
Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 182 (1982).
146
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(iii) (2006).
147
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
148
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2006); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 182.
149
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (2006).
150
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2006).
151
See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415 (e)–(k).
152
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2006).
153
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (2006).
154
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(A) (2006).
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With such overarching procedural requirements, the IDEA ensures
that children in need of services have a person who is partial to their
education. 155
To ensure that these procedural requirements are given effect,
the IDEA requires recipient states to create the infrastructure that their
school districts will use to provide the necessary services to children
with disabilities. § 1412(a) requires them to submit plans that show
how they will provide eligible students with the services necessary for
appropriate education in the LRE. 156 School boards must submit to
their state “educational agency” plans on how they will meet the
IDEA’s requirements. 157 § 1413 comprises the spending specifications
that were lacking in the ESEA of 1965 and the EHA of 1970. School
boards must use federal funds only to pay for “excess costs of
providing special education and related services to children with
disabilities;” to “supplement State, local and other Federal funds and
not to supplant such funds;” and to reduce the amount of local funds
put towards providing special education services. 158 Thus, the IDEA
gives the states the “primary responsibility” for creating educational
policies for children with disabilities, 159 while ensuring that those
programs meet certain federal standards through the extensive
procedural requirements. 160
A critical part of those procedural requirements is the dispute
resolution process. §§ 1415(e)–(i) outline the infrastructure that
recipient states must construct for disputes that arise between school
boards and parents of students with disabilities. 161 First, the parties
may seek to resolve their dispute through mediation. 162 Even if that
process is chosen, it does not preclude the parties from initiating a due
155

Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 182 n.6 (1982).
156
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006).
157
20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2006).
158
20 U.S.C. §§ 1413(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006).
159
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 183.
160
Id. at 182.
161
20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)–(i) (2006).
162
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2006).
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process hearing. 163 If the parties decide to initiate a due process
hearing in front of a disinterested “hearing officer,” who is
independent from the state’s education agency or the involved school
district and is capable of conducting a legitimate hearing. 164 Any party
is entitled to appeal before the state’s education agency. 165 Decisions
made in the hearing and on appeal are binding, 166 but any party is
entitled to file a civil action in federal district court. 167
The procedural requirements are robust, yet they leave
discretion with the states to form educational policies. This
“‘cooperative federalism’” 168 includes nothing about equal services
from state to state. After all, the focus of the IDEA is the individual
student. This focus is supported by the language of the IDEA. For
instance, if Congress intended for each state to have the same amount
of funding, and thus the same amount of services, it would not have
used language such as “appropriate” 169 or “individuals.” 170 The level
of generality that the IDEA uses also supports the notion that
Congress’ focus was on individuals, not states. Therefore, the level of
service for each state must be determined by the number of students
within a state’s borders who are in need of special education services
and by the amount of services that children need to ensure that they
are receiving an appropriate education. Congress cannot create blanket
national standards if it wants to ensure that each child with a disability
is receiving the type of education that is appropriate for him or her.
Ultimately, the structure and operations of the IDEA must be
interpreted in light of the preference for including children with
disabilities among children who do not have disabilities. Many of the
provisions operate in ways that ensure that school districts prefer
placing the child with disabilities in regular education environments. A
163

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A) (2006).
165
20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2006).
166
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A) (2006).
167
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2006).
168
See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005).
169
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006).
170
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4) (2006).
164
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test that examines the reasonableness of a board’s decision in placing
the student with disabilities in one environment or another adheres to
this preference, keeps courts in the courthouses, and ensures that the
IDEA’s procedural safeguards operate to keep parents or partial
parties involved in that student’s education.
III. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT AND HOW IT SHOULD
BE RESOLVED IN LIGHT OF THE IDEA’S LANGUAGE
AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Reasonableness Test
In Board of Education v. Ross, the Seventh Circuit was asked
to reverse the district court’s affirmance of an independent hearing
officer’s finding that the school board did not violate the IDEA when
it placed Michael and Diane Ross’ daughter, Lindsay, in a restrictive
special education setting. 171 Lindsay had Rett syndrome, which is
caused by mutations on a gene found on the X chromosome that
affects almost exclusively females. 172 Lindsay was nonverbal, lacked a
consistent ability to control her body and limbs, and had cognitive
functioning equivalent to that of an eight-to-ten-month-old girl. 173
Often, Lindsay’s hands would lock together, which would require a
teacher to unlock them. 174 In addition, Lindsay created loud
vocalizations lasting from a few seconds to over a minute. 175 She also
inflicted injuries upon herself and sometimes struck others. 176 Before
high school, she attended a regular public school in her neighborhood,
where she was mainstreamed. 177

171

Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 269
(7th Cir. 2007).
172
Id.
173
Id. at 271.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
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In light of these various disruptions, her IEP team convened to
reevaluate Lindsay’s IEP. 178 After much compromise, the parents
agreed to place Lindsay in her local high school under a shortened
schedule. 179 After a year of modest improvement, Lindsay began to
exhibit stress, fatigue, and overall regression while in the general
education environment. 180 The board decided to put Lindsay in a
multiple needs program. 181 The parents objected and initiated a due
process hearing. 182
The independent hearing officer and district court both agreed
that the school board complied with the IDEA’s LRE requirement. 183
On appeal, the Rosses maintained that the school board failed to
consider all supplementary aids and services that could be used at
Lindsay’s neighborhood school. 184 The board provided Lindsay with a
special education teacher to work with her in between academic years,
as well as another special education teacher and a teacher’s aide
during the school year. 185
The Seventh Circuit declined to overturn the findings at the
state or lower court levels, and in doing so, it devised its test for
evaluating LRE compliance. The Court first noted that “it is not
enough to show that a student is obtaining some benefit, no matter
how minimal, at the mainstream school” in order to demonstrate that a
board’s removal of a student with a disability violated the LRE
requirement. 186 To successfully challenge a board’s decision to
remove a student with a disability from a mainstreamed setting, parties
challenging a placement must show—after the reviewing court gives
“due deference to the administrative findings”—that the student’s
education was satisfactory and, if not, that “reasonable measures
178

Id.
Id. at 272.
180
Id. at 273.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 275.
185
Id. at 272.
186
Id. at 277 (emphasis in original).
179
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would have made it so.” 187 In other words, if the court determines that
the general education classroom was satisfactory, the school district
erred in removing the student with a disability. 188 If the environment
was not satisfactory but there were reasonable measures available to
make it satisfactory, the school board erred in removing the student. 189
Applying that inquiry, the Ross court concluded that the board
did not err. First, the Rosses could not demonstrate that Lindsay was
making “meaningful progress” in the general education
environment. 190 The IEP goals that she met were achieved in the
segregated setting, not in the general education environment. 191
During the spring of one year, she attended her English class for the
full period only twice. 192 She interacted with her peers minimally and
disrupted the class with her loud vocalizations and physical
interference. 193 The court deferred to the opinions of experts who
testified at the administrative and lower court levels. It found that the
administrative findings and judgment, as well as the district court’s
conclusion to uphold them, were reasonable and free from clear
error. 194 The services that the school board provided were reasonable,
and the lower level fact-finders concluded that, because Lindsay was
not receiving an appropriate education in the general education
environment, even with those services, its decision to remove Lindsay
did not violate the IDEA. 195
B. The Third Circuit’s Multi-Factor Test
Oberti v. Board of Education was the first case in the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit to interpret the LRE provision of the
IDEA. Rafael Oberti was an eight-year-old boy afflicted with Down
187

Id.
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 278.
195
Id.
188
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syndrome. 196 His first IEP provided that he would attend a
“developmental” kindergarten at his neighborhood school in the
morning. 197 In the afternoon, he would attend a special education class
in another school district. 198 In the developmental class, Rafael was
disruptive. 199 He routinely crawled and hid under furniture, and he
was violent—on several occasions, hitting and spitting on other
children, the teacher, and the teacher’s aide. 200 However, during his
special education class, he was not disruptive. 201 Accordingly, his IEP
Team proposed placing Rafael in a segregated special education class
for the entire year. 202 The parents objected to this decision, 203 but the
school board refused to modify its proposal. Through mediation, the
dispute was resolved so that Rafael would attend a segregated class.
While in the more restrictive environment, Rafael’s behavior
improved and he began to make academic progress. 204
The Obertis objected to this placement when they learned that
Rafael had no meaningful contact with his peers who were not
disabled. 205 They initiated a due process hearing. 206 The
administrative law judge (ALJ) heard testimony from both sides. 207
The school board presented eight witnesses, all of whom had close
contact with Rafael. 208 They all testified to one degree or another that
a segregated setting was more appropriate for Rafael. 209 The Obertis
presented two expert witnesses, a psychologist from Temple
University and a special education specialist from Rafael’s
196

Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204,
1207 (3d Cir. 1993).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 1208.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 1209.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 1209 n.7.
209
Id.
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placement. 210 They testified that Rafael could be mainstreamed with
enough services. 211 The ALJ discounted their opinions because they
did not have the same degree of familiarity with Rafael as the school
board’s witnesses. 212 Concluding that Rafael was not ready for
mainstreaming, the ALJ affirmed the school board’s decision to place
him in the least restrictive environment. 213
The Third Circuit disagreed with the ALJ’s decision. At the
beginning of its discussion on the LRE requirement, it cited the
Fourteenth Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the
IDEA from 1992, wherein the U.S. Department of Education reported
that two-thirds of the states that received funding were not in
compliance. 214 In light of that report, it declared its “obligation to
enforce the statutory provisions [of the IDEA].” 215 Certainly,
Congress gave the federal judiciary an important role in helping to
ensure that the states complied with the IDEA. 216 However, in light of
the court’s use of this report, its interpretation of the LRE requirement
as creating a presumption for mainstreaming, and the little deference it
gave to the school board and the ALJ, the Oberti court seemed to give
itself an affirmative role in ensuring that school boards mainstream
students with disabilities. 217
The Fifth Circuit’s test in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of
Education 218 was adopted by the Oberti court. 219 The Fifth Circuit’s
test consists of two parts. First, the reviewing court must ask “whether
210

Id. at 1209–10. The Obertis also presented their own testimony and that of a
neighbor to support their argument that, with additional services and aids, Rafael
was capable of progressing in a general education classroom. For purposes of the
ALJ’s decision and the Third Circuit’s rejection of that decision, only the two expert
witnesses are necessary.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 1210.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 1214 n.20.
215
Id. at 1214.
216
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2006); Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).
217
Oberti, 995 F.3d at 1216–17.
218
874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989)
219
Oberti, 995 F.3d at 1215.
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education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids
and services, can be achieved satisfactorily.” 220 Second, if education
cannot be achieved satisfactorily within the regular classroom, then the
reviewing court must decide “whether the school has mainstreamed
the child to the maximum extent appropriate.” 221 For the first question,
the Oberti court identified three factors. First, the reviewing court
should examine the steps that the school took to try to include the
child in a regular classroom. 222 It based this factor on Department of
Education regulations, which require schools to (1) provide a
“continuum of placements” 223 that offer alternatives to the regular
education environment and (2) provide for additional services that aid
a student with a disability placed in a general education
environment. 224 Courts consider this factor to weigh “particularly
heavily against the School Board” because if a party shows that the
school board failed to provide such services, the school board has most
likely failed to provide an FAPE. 225 Given this factor’s importance, it
can be considered to provide grounds for the most intrusive scrutiny
by courts employing this test.
Second, the reviewing court should compare the benefits that a
disabled child would receive from placement in a general education
classroom with the benefits that she would receive from placement in
a segregated setting. 226 The Oberti court remarked that this factor’s
analysis requires heavy reliance on testimony of educational experts
and paying special attention to the “unique benefits” obtained from
integration in a regular classroom. 227 Interestingly, and unfounded in
the language of the IDEA, the court concluded that “Congress
understood that a fundamental value of the right to public education
220

Daniel, 874 F.2d at 1048.
Id.
222
Oberti, 995 F.3d at 1216.
223
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2009).
224
Id.
225
Warton v. New Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 217 F. Supp. 2d 261, 275 (D. Conn.
2002).
226
Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216.
227
Id.
221
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for children with disabilities is the right to associate with nondisabled
peers.” 228
Third, the court should examine to what extent a disabled
child’s placement in a regular classroom will “negatively” affect other
children. 229 The Oberti court was careful to emphasize that for this
factor to provide grounds for the removal of a child with a disability
from a general classroom, the disruption must be so significant as to
“impair” other students from being educated satisfactorily. 230 This
question requires considering how much attention the teacher gave to
the student with a disability and whether that attention reached a
degree that caused her to ignore the other students. 231 In its
explanation of this factor, the court noted that it should be considered
in light of the first factor described above, i.e., that the services that
the school board has to provide might present some disruption. 232
Therefore, the court seemed to imply that there will inevitably be some
negative effects; the question is how much.
When the court applied these factors, it concluded that the
school board had not complied with this mainstreaming
requirement. 233 For the first factor, it characterized the school board’s
efforts as “negligible,” concluding that the board did not do enough to
satisfy the factor because it did not provide a curriculum plan, a
behavior management plan, or enough support to the teacher. 234
Considering the importance that this factor has in the compliance
analysis, the court’s conclusion could have rested on this failure alone.
It remarked that the board’s failure to provide these services violated
the IDEA. 235
The court concluded that the board did not meet the second
factor because the benefits of integration outweighed the benefits of
228

Id. at 1216–17.
Id. at 1217.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 1220–24.
234
Id. at 1220.
235
Id. at 1221.
229
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segregation. 236 It agreed with the district court’s finding, which relied
heavily on testimony, some of which was not given at the
administrative hearing. 237 The board’s witnesses, as described above,
testified that the most appropriate placement for Rafael was a
segregated setting. 238 Conflictingly, the Obertis’ witnesses testified
that, with more services and the modification of the curriculum for
Rafael, he could be included in a general education classroom. 239
While the ALJ determined that the board had presented enough
evidence to demonstrate appropriateness, the Oberti court concluded
that the district court gave “due weight” when it heard different
testimony, which resulted in the overturning of the ALJ’s
determinations. 240
The court also concluded that the board failed to satisfy the
third factor. It concluded that the behavior that Rafael exhibited while
placed in the general classroom—throwing furniture, hitting other
children and the teacher, hiding, etc.—was an inadequate justification
for removal because the board did not satisfy the first factor. 241 The
district court found that if the board provided Rafael with additional
support services, he would cause less disruption, which the Oberti
court found not to be clearly erroneous. 242
The Ross test differs from the Oberti test in significant ways.
Ross affords administrative findings and school board decisions
greater deference than the Oberti test does. Under Ross, the district
court and the appellate court are to give “due deference.” This
language is in contrast to the Oberti test that, by its nature, allows a
higher level of scrutiny by reviewing courts. Oberti requires the
reviewing court to engage in a multi-factor test that inevitably puts the
court in the classroom. This type of analysis is of the same character

236

Id. at 1222.
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
237
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and on the same level as school boards’ placement determinations.243
The “due deference” weight under Ross, in contrast, does not yield
entirely to the findings of administrative hearings and school districts,
but it does not intrude deeply upon the province of school officials
because it is tempered by the “reasonable measures” standard. 244
According to this language, a court will defer to the lower level
findings insofar as it is not unreasonable to do so. As a result, a court
will avoid engaging in analysis that the IDEA leaves for school
boards. 245
C. Supreme Court Precedent and Pertinent IDEA Language
1. Rowley’s Impact
In Board of Education v. Rowley, 246 the Supreme Court held
that an FAPE requires states receiving federal funding to “provid[e]
personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the
child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” 247 In Rowley, the
parents of a deaf student, Amy, sued the school board for violating the
IDEA when it failed to provide their daughter with an education that
did not maximize her potential. 248 During elementary school, Amy
progressed from grade to grade without problem and was an aboveaverage student. 249 During this time, she did not have an interpreter
with her in the classroom. 250 The school board determined that Amy
did not need an interpreter to comply with the IDEA. 251 The parents
disagreed, arguing that her achievement could be much higher if she
243

See id. at 1217–18.
Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 277
(7th Cir. 2007)..
245
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (2006); Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick
Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207–09 (1982).
246
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
247
Id. at 203.
248
Id. at 185–86.
249
Id. at 185.
250
Id.
251
Id. at 184–85.
244
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had an interpreter and that, without one, the school board violated the
FAPE requirement. 252
The Supreme Court disagreed. 253 In doing so, it devised a twopart test for determining whether a school board complied with the
IDEA’s FAPE requirements. First, “has the State complied with the
procedures set forth in the Act?” 254 And second, is the IEP,
“developed through the Act’s procedures[,] reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits?”255 It concluded that a
state was not obligated to maximize the potential of students receiving
IDEA services; it is only obligated to provide “personalized
instruction” with enough support services to allow the child to benefit
from that instruction. 256 The intent of the IDEA “was more to open the
door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms
than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.” 257
Applying this standard to the facts in Rowley, the Court found
that the school board had complied with the FAPE requirement. 258 As
the district court found, Amy had been progressing from grade to
grade with above average performance. 259 The school board provided
her with instruction and services that were tailored to her individual
needs. 260 Because of her demonstrated progress, the Court concluded
that the school board did not have to provide her with a sign-language
interpreter to comply with the IDEA. 261
In its decision, the Court emphasized the importance of
deference to school boards and to the administrative hearing
process. 262 While the Court was unwilling to go so far as to agree with
the school board that Congress meant to give reviewing courts only
252

Id. at 185.
Id. at 200.
254
Id. at 206.
255
Id. at 207.
256
Id. at 200 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 14 (1975)).
257
Id. at 192.
258
Id. at 210.
259
Id. at 209–10.
260
Id. at 210.
261
Id.
262
Id. at 207–10.
253
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“limited authority to review for state compliance,” and no authority to
review a program’s substance, it was also unwilling to side with
Rowley, who advocated for de novo review. 263 Instead, it concluded
that the language of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i), which provides administrative
procedures for the reviewing court to follow, requires it to give “due
weight” to the findings at the administrative hearing level. 264
It based its emphasis on the statutory structure and legislative
history of the IDEA. 265 It was unwilling to side with the school board
because Congress provided that the reviewing court must “bas[e] its
decision on the preponderance of the evidence.” 266 In addition, the
legislative history indicated that Congress wanted the reviewing courts
to make “‘independent decisions.’” 267 This preponderance standard, in
light of that history, indicated that Congress meant for the reviewing
courts to have a fair amount of reviewing power, but an amount that
fell short of de novo. 268 Given the highly detailed provisions of
§ 1415 269 that outline the administrative hearing process, in relation to
the vague “substantive admonitions” of the IDEA, the Court
determined that Congress meant for the procedural guidelines to
263

Id. at 206.
Id. In 1982, this language was under § 1415(e). Its equivalent today is 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i)–(iii) (2006), which provides:
264

(C) Additional requirements. In any action brought under this
paragraph, the court-(i) shall receive the records of the administrative
proceedings;
(ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party;
and
(iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence,
shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.
265

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204–09.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006).
267
Rowley, 458 U.S. at at 205 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-455, at 50 (1975)).
268
Id.
269
20 U.S.C. § 1415 provides the “[p]rocedural safeguards” of the dispute
resolution process within the IDEA. It covers ten pages of the United States Code,
with thirteen different subsections.
266
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ensure substantive compliance with the IDEA. 270 These highly
detailed procedural requirements ensured that the parents and the
school boards were equally involved in the formulation of educational
goals for the student with a disability. 271 In addition, the IDEA
requires that the district court “receive the records of the
administrative proceedings.” 272 This importance that “Congress has
attached to compliance with certain procedures” would be undermined
if a reviewing court used de novo review. 273
The Court also pointed to federalist principles for support in its
decision to require courts to defer to the administrative hearing
process. 274 The IDEA left with the states, local educational agencies,
and the students’ parents the principal responsibility of providing
children with disabilities with an appropriate education. 275 Local
education agencies are responsible for providing to their Secretary of
State plans that demonstrate their compliance with the IDEA. 276
Moreover, states traditionally formulate and execute educational
policy. 277 Given this traditional role, coupled with clear statutory
language, the Court refused to conclude that Congress intended to
grant federal courts a degree of power that would allow them to
overturn local boards’ decisions, affirmed by state administrative
hearing processes, as easily as de novo would allow. 278
Even though Rowley concerns the FAPE requirement of the
IDEA, it should provide some guidance as to what constitutes an LRE.
In fact, one court said that Rowley does have an impact on LRE,
“demarcat[ing] an outer limit to the IDEA’s LRE preference.” 279
While many courts have determined that Rowley’s two-part test is “not
270

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–06.
Id. at 206. See discussion supra Part II.
272
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i) (2006).
273
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
274
Id at 207.
275
Id.
276
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (2006).
277
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208 n.30.
278
See id. at 205–08.
279
See A.S. ex rel. S. v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 183 F.Supp. 2d. 534, 541 (D.
Conn. 2002).
271
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particularly useful” in determining whether the LRE requirement is
satisfied, that determination does not mean that the opinion should be
ignored outright when examining an LRE. 280 As this Note will
examine in greater detail in Part III.A.2, what is appropriate for an
FAPE and for an LRE should be analyzed together.
This relationship is consistent with the IDEA’s language as
interpreted in Rowley and the Seventh Circuit’s test in Board of
Education v. Ross. 281 In Rowley, the Court observed that Congress did
not intend for there to be a rigid presumption for mainstreaming; it
first characterized the Act’s language as creating a “preference for
‘mainstreaming,’” and then noted that the language even provides for
some students with disabilities to be educated in an entirely segregated
setting. 282 Oberti’s characterization of LRE as requiring a
presumption 283 ignores this observation and how it should relate to the
deference that the Rowley Court emphasized.
In addition, these characterizations of the IDEA interfere with
the prerogatives of the states to formulate their educational policies
that Rowley concluded remained with them. While the Rowley Court
recognized that the IDEA “imposes significant requirements” on
states, the greater part of the opinion is devoted to discussing how the
IDEA left to the states the task of formulating educational polices that
address the placement of a child with a disability. 284 To impose upon
the states a presumption, or to afford a student with a disability a
“right” to being mainstreamed, usurps this responsibility of the states
because it ignores the careful and highly detailed deliberations in
which the IEP teams engage when formulating IEPs. These tests
requiring school boards to rebut a presumption of mainstreaming or
inclusion do not incorporate the deference that the Rowley Court found
Congress intended courts to give to the states and their school boards.

280

See Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968, 982 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
See 486 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2007).
282
Rowley, 435 U.S. at 181 n.4 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006)).
283
Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d
1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993).
284
See Rowley, 435 US at 183.
281
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2. § 1412
Examining the pertinent language of the IDEA shows that
Rowley should be considered when determining whether a school
board has complied with the LRE requirement. The LRE provision of
the IDEA, § 1412(a)(5)(A), provides that children with disabilities are
to be educated with children without disabilities “[t]o the maximum
extent appropriate.” 285 As the Supreme Court observed, this language
establishes at least a preference for including a child with a disability
in a general education environment. 286 Moreover, properly
understanding the operative effect of the LRE provision requires
reading it in light of the rest of the statute. 287 The section immediately
following it qualifies this mainstreaming requirement by providing:
A State funding mechanism shall not result in
placements that violate the requirements of
[§ 1412(a)(5)(A)], and a State shall not use a funding
mechanism by which the State distributes funds on the
basis of the type of setting in which a child is served
that will result in the failure to provide a child with a
disability a free appropriate public education according
285

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006). This subsection provides in full that
(A) In general. To the maximum extent appropriate, children
with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions
or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not
disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal
of children with disabilities from the regular educational
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.

286

Rowley, 435 U.S. at 202–03.
See Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516,
523 (2007) (“a proper interpretation of the Act requires a consideration of the entire
statutory scheme”). The Winkelman Court held that parents of students with
disabilities are entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. Id. at 535.
287
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to the unique needs of the child as described in the
child’s IEP. 288
This language essentially provides that a state cannot fund money in
any way that violates the mainstreaming requirement, or base the
distribution of funds on a setting that is inappropriate for the particular
child and would consequently fail to provide that child with an FAPE.
First, this qualifying provision demonstrates that there is not a
presumption for mainstreaming. If a state could base the disbursement
of federal funds on placing a student with a disability in a general
education setting, it would be in violation of this provision unless the
school board rebuts a presumption for the placement. But as the
language indicates, the setting must be tailored to the “unique needs”
of the child. 289 By definition, a presumption does not take into account
unique needs. The language of § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) does not support
such a scheme.
Second, this provision requires a recipient state to consider the
placement of a student with a disability when determining whether the
student is receiving an FAPE. As established above, a state cannot
distribute funds based on the placement of a student with a disability
in an environment that would deprive him of an FAPE. Therefore,
because a school district has to certify to its Secretary of State that it
has policies to comply with the IDEA, 290 that district has to show that
it is placing students in environments that will not deprive them of
FAPEs. This requirement necessitates a district to consider the FAPE
and LRE in light of each other.
In this light, therefore, Rowley’s interpretation of an FAPE is
relevant to an LRE determination. A reasonableness test better
provides for this dynamic than an Oberti-type factor-based test that
intrudes upon the province of school officials. First, a school board is
charged with formulating educational policies for the individual
students with disabilities. As §§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and 1413 provide, a
school district has to certify to its state government that it is complying
288

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
Id.
290
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (2006).
289
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with the IDEA, 291 and to do so, it must draft policies that place
students with disabilities in environments that will not compromise
their FAPEs. To satisfy these provisions, a school board will have to
carefully consider each student’s placement. This expertise provided
the main reason for the Rowley Court’s emphasis on giving deference
to school board determinations. 292
A reasonableness test is sensitive to these considerations. It
gives the deference that is necessary to ensure that a school board’s
determinations are not disturbed unless a reviewing court finds that a
school board could have used “reasonable measures” to provide a
child with an FAPE in a general education environment, and it did not
do so. 293 This largely deferential inquiry will leave intact the careful
deliberations in which schools boards are required to engage when
formulating IEPs. In addition, it will leave intact the judgments
rendered by the administrative hearing process that each state is
required to provide and that the Supreme Court concluded was a
mechanism in ensuring substantive compliance. 294
Conversely, an Oberti-type factor-based test that is premised
on the misunderstanding that students with disabilities have a right to
be included in the general education environment intrudes into these
careful deliberations, and this can ultimately be counterproductive and
violative of the IDEA. For instance, if a student is violent towards his
peers and is destructive towards school property, and a school board
determines that such a student is disruptive and therefore should be
removed from the general education environment, that determination
is partially based on §§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and 1413 . If a reviewing
court, applying a test similar to the Oberti test, overturns that decision
and puts the student with a disability back in the general education
environment, it puts that student in a placement that the school board
determined was inappropriate, which is inconsistent with the FAPE
291

See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1413.
Bd. of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
293
Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 277
(7th Cir. 2007).
294
See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–07.
292
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requirement. This forced placement is contrary to the school board’s
compliance with §§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and 1413.
Moreover, school districts that are within the jurisdiction of a
reviewing court that employs this type of test will be forced to
formulate IEPs that would pass this test. To do so, the districts will
place students in general education environments even when they
might have done otherwise. This result is inconsistent with the
operations of §§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and 1413. However, a
reasonableness test along the lines of Ross’s “reasonable measures”
inquiry comports with these statutory provisions by virtue of its
deference. It will not question the delicate decisions that school boards
make when determining whether the placement of a student with a
disability is appropriate in light of his or her FAPE.
Given the language of the IDEA, a Ross-type test is preferable.
While a Ross-type test has its shortcomings, it is superior to an Obertitype test under federalist principles as well. By its nature, Ross’s
standard sets a lower bar for school districts than a factor-based test.
Conceivably, a student with a disability could be placed in a more
restrictive setting than is appropriate because a school board refuses to
provide more services than it considers to be “reasonable.” However,
in light of Supreme Court precedent that observed the federalism
dynamic that the IDEA provides, a Ross type test is more appropriate.
Federalism precedent holds that when construing a statute, it should
not be read to infringe on traditional realms of state power. 295
Education is a traditional realm of state power. 296 The Rowley Court
concluded that the IDEA kept education with the states, even though it
imposed conditions upon how federal funds were to be spent for
special education. 297 The Court did not conclude that the IDEA
provided for federal intrusion into this realm of power, and without a
“clear and manifest purpose” in a statute’s language, courts are not to
interpret federal legislation to so intrude. 298 An Oberti-type test
intrudes too far into this realm, upsetting this traditional federalist
295

Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 345 (1994)
U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
297
Rowley, 458 U.S. 183–84.
298
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
296
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relationship. Moreover, as demonstrated, it could potentially lead to
results that conflict with the very statute that it is enforcing.
3. Schaffer v. Weast’s Impact
One ground for the presumption for integration in a general
education environment was the understanding that a school board
always had the burden of persuasion in cases involving the IDEA. 299
The Oberti court made the same interpretation. 300 But the Supreme
Court has since rejected that interpretation, calling the integration
presumption into questionable light that goes beyond the operations of
§§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and 1413.
In Schaffer v. Weast, the Court held that, instead of the burden
always being placed on the school board, it would be “placed upon the
party seeking relief.” 301 Therefore, when students with disabilities
seek to challenge their placements, they will have the burden of
persuasion. In Schaffer, Brian suffered from learning disabilities and
speech-language impairments. 302 From preschool to seventh grade, he
was placed in a private school, where he struggled academically. 303
School officials informed his parents that the IEP team needed to
reevaluate his IEP and place him in a setting that would “better

299

Bd. of Educ., Sacramento City United Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp.
874, 880 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d, 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
300
Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204,
1207 (3d Cir. 1993).
301
546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005). Its holding applied only to the “burden of
persuasion.” Id. at 56. The Court found it necessary to explain the term “burden of
proof” as “one of the slipperiest member[s] of the family of legal terms.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). “Burden of proof” contained two different burdens:
“burden of persuasion,” “i.e., which party loses if the evidence is closely balanced,”
and the “‘burden of production,’ i.e., which party bears the obligation to come
forward with the evidence at different points in the proceeding.” Id. (quoting Dir.,
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dept. of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512
U.S. 267, 272 (1994)). The Court was careful to say that Schaffer concerns “only the
burden of persuasion.” Id.
302
Id. at 54.
303
Id.
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accommodate his needs.” 304 Brian’s parents contacted the local school
board, which evaluated Brian and developed an IEP that placed him in
either of its two middle schools. 305 Brian’s parents disagreed; they
believed that Brian needed “smaller classes and more intensive
services.” 306 They unilaterally placed Brian in another private school,
initiated a due process hearing challenging the school board’s IEP, and
sought compensation for the cost of Brian’s tuition at the private
school. 307
After a rather complex procedural history, in which the case
went up and down the judicial ladder twice, the Fourth Circuit held
that there was no persuasive reason for always resting the burden of
persuasion with the school district. 308 The Supreme Court affirmed. It
rejected the parents’ argument that a school board should always have
the burden of persuasion, even when it is not seeking relief. 309
Traditionally, the party seeking relief has the burden of persuasion.
Cases in which the burden of persuasion is placed on the opposing
party at the beginning of a proceeding are rare, and without express
direction from Congress, the Court was unwilling to depart from that
traditional rule. 310
Consequently, since Schaffer, the Oberti presumption for
integration, as embodied in its factor test, stands in questionable light.
Its placement of the burden on the school board provides one basis for
its presumption. Indeed, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California remarked that the presumption for
integration rested on the school board bearing the burden of
persuasion. 311 The court cited a federal regulation that implemented
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as its basis for this presumption. 312 It
304

Id.
Id.
306
Id. at 54–55.
307
Id. at 55.
308
Id.
309
Id. at 59.
310
Id.
311
Bd. of Educ., Sacramento City United Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp.
874, 880 n. 7 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d, 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
312
Id.
305
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even noted that “[a]lthough this regulation is not promulgated under
the IDEA, it reflects the same strong preference for
mainstreaming.” 313 Of course, this obscure federal authority,
promulgated to implement an unrelated piece of legislation, is
unworthy of such reliance in light of Schaffer.
The Oberti court did not rely on such tenuous authority, but
instead relied on what is today § 1412(a)(5), the provision for
mainstreaming. 314 However, as previously established, § 1412(a)(5)
does not provide for a presumption because of § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i)’s
requirement that FAPE and LRE be examined together. 315 Even if one
disagrees with this interpretation of §1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and the
operative result it has with § 1413, 316 the burden of persuasion can no
longer provide a basis for an integration presumption. Thus, standing
alone, the Schaffer holding casts Oberti’s presumption for inclusion
into doubt. Because the Oberti test was created partially because of
this presumption, it too is cast into doubt by the Schaffer holding.
When one considers the statutory provisions of §§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i)
and 1413, which brings in the Rowley opinion, together with Schaffer,
such a factor test rests on shaky foundations.
IV. AN INAPPROPRIATE OUTCOME UNDER OBERTI
Oberti’s intrusive consequences can be demonstrated by
examining A.S. ex rel. S. v. Norwalk Board of Education, 317 a district
court case from the Second Circuit that applied the Oberti test. 318 In
A.S., A. was in a segregated facility until the fourth grade. 319 After that
time, she was mainstreamed with an aide and an independent
313

Id.
See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995
F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (1994)).
315
See supra Part III.C.2.
316
Id.
317
183 F. Supp. 2d 534 (D. Conn. 2002).
318
The Second Circuit adopted the Oberti test in P. v. Newington Board of
Education, 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008).
319
A.S., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
314
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consultant. 320 After behavior problems escalated, the school board
recommended placing A. in a segregated setting by the time she
reached high school. 321 The parents objected, and both sides agreed to
place A. in a general education setting with the same IEP plan for the
previous year. 322 During that year, A.’s behavior problems continued,
and the board renewed its proposal to place A. in a segregated setting
while mainstreaming her in certain non-academic courses. 323 When
each side refused to compromise, they filed separate due process
hearings. 324 The IHO concluded that A.’s placement in a general
education setting was inappropriate. 325 Applying Oberti, it also found,
however, that the board’s proposal did not satisfy the IDEA’s LRE. 326
Consequently, the IHO ordered both parties to reconvene to generate a
new IEP that met A.’s needs appropriately. 327 It concluded that the
board had to compensate A.’s parents for their use of expert
consultants during the failed attempts at creating a new IEP. 328 The
board appealed, but the district court, reviewing the IHO’s application
of the Oberti factors, upheld the finding.
A. Oberti’s First Factor
Looking at the first factor, “whether the school district has
made reasonable efforts to accommodate the child in a regular
classroom,” 329 the court determined that the board had not considered
enough degrees of services. 330 The school board provided a special
education teacher, educational consultants, a behavioral consultant, a
320

Id.
Id.
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Id. at 538.
325
Id.
326
Id.
327
Id.
328
Id. at 539.
329
Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d
1204, 1218 (3d Cir. 1993).
330
A.S., 183 F. Supp. at 542.
321
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physical and occupational therapist, a speech and language therapist,
and a teacher of the visually impaired. 331 The IHO concluded that the
board failed to consider more services that might have allowed for A.
to continue in a regular education environment, and the court
agreed. 332 It also found that the board did not consider providing A.
with “direct special education services” in the regular classroom,
“rather than leav[ing] the student to receive educational directions
from an aide or a regular education teacher who does not have the
expertise of a special education teacher.” 333 The court agreed and
found that the school should have considered peer tutoring, scripting,
additional staff training and extracurricular activities. 334
In its decision, the court said that Oberti required a school
board to consider every possibility and provide whatever service might
help a child achieve academic progress in a regular education
setting. 335 It relied on § 1412(a)(5)(A)’s language that schools must
include students with disabilities with students who do not have
disabilities “to the maximum extent appropriate.” 336 “[T]he plain
language of the IDEA and its related regulations do not limit the scope
of supplemental aids and service to be provided to disabled children in
a regular education setting.” 337
However, as demonstrated above, the text of the IDEA does
not provide a basis for this reading when examining §§ 1412(a)(5)(A),
1412(a)(5)(B), and 1413 together. As previously established,
§ 1412(a)(5)(A) does not stand alone and needs to be read in light of
the funding and certification requirements. 338 These concomitant
operations require that in an LRE inquiry, the reviewing court examine
the student’s FAPE. 339 Because an FAPE is included in the
331

Id. at 543.
Id.
333
Id.
334
Id.
335
Id. at 545.
336
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006).
337
Oberti, 183 F. Supp. at 545.
338
See supra Part III.C.2.
339
Id.
332
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determination of whether the LRE requirement has been complied
with, Rowley must apply. Rowley held that a disabled child is entitled
to “personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit
the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” 340 It refused
to require school boards to provide disabled children with educational
services that would maximize their potential. 341 If it can be said that
any particular student’s LRE requires a consideration of that student’s
FAPE, then the A.S. court incorrectly interpreted § 1412(a)(5)(A)’s
“[t]o the maximum extent appropriate” language. To require a school
board to consider and provide all possible services that would achieve
a student’s FAPE would require the board to maximize that student’s
education potential in a general education environment. This
application is beyond the calling of the IDEA and Rowley, even if the
A.S. court is addressing an LRE question.
Under Ross, however, the school board’s efforts would have
most likely passed muster. In Ross, the school board provided Lindsay
with half the services that the school board in A.S. provided A. Lindsay
received special education services from two special education
teachers, one in the summer and one during the school year, and a
teacher’s aide to supplement the regular teacher’s services while she
was mainstreamed. 342 In addition, Lindsay received services from the
school’s special education program for the half of the day that she was
not in the general education classroom. A. received considerably more
services: a special education teacher, educational consultants, a
behavioral consultant, a physical and occupational therapist, a speech
and language therapist, and a teacher of the visually impaired. 343
Certainly, if the Ross court upheld a decision to remove a student
receiving less service than A., it would similarly uphold the decision
of the school board.
340

Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 203 (1982).
341
Id. at 198.
342
Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 272
(7th Cir. 2007).
343
A.S. ex rel. S. v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 183 F. Supp. 2d 534, 542–43 (D.
Conn. 2002)
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B. Oberti’s Second Factor
To satisfy this factor, the A.S. court remarked that “the
appropriate yardstick is whether A., with appropriate supplemental
aids and services, can make progress towards her IEP goals in the
regular education setting.” 344 The court concluded that A. could be
mainstreamed, so long as she had additional services beyond the
consultants and aides that she already had. 345 The school board argued
that the lack of academic progress indicated that the more appropriate
placement for A. was in a more restricted setting. 346 The court, along
with the IHO, disagreed, saying that the board should have offered
more services. 347
This conclusion raises a fundamental question: in light of this
decision, how much service is “appropriate”? As established above,
the A.S. court, applying Oberti, required the school board to provide
every possible service. 348 However, research has shown that such a
degree of services can be counterproductive. Feelings of inferiority
and self-consciousness may arise among students with disabilities
placed in regular education environments, and such feelings contribute
to disruptive behavior and the impairment of academic progress. Two
social scientists found that older students with disabilities, possessing
more cognitive ability than younger students or those suffering from
more severe disabilities, and thus able to better articulate their
feelings, preferred less time with their peers because it was “less
embarrassing than having a specialist come into the classroom.” 349
Another scholar notes that these feelings may arise from an
“unwarranted integration presumption,” 350 i.e., placing students with
344

Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
Id. at 545–549.
346
Id. at 546.
347
Id. at 545.
348
See supra p. 45.
349
Nancy L. Waldron & James McLesky, The Effects of an Inclusive School
Program on Students with Mild and Severe Learning Disabilities, 64 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILD. 395, 402 (1988).
350
Colker, supra note 44, at 833.
345
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disabilities in general education classrooms before there has been
sufficient demonstration that the student will respond by showing
academic progress, which is an important factor in determining
whether the child is receiving an FAPE 351 . In any event, this evidence
at least shows that the deference that the IDEA requires reviewing
courts to give to the findings of administrative hearings should be
greater than the third factor of the Oberti test. If empirical data, as well
as findings at the state level, show that disruption is caused by
inappropriate integration, a reviewing court, given limited authority to
overrule those findings under Rowley, should not apply a level of
scrutiny thate discounts them.
This particular problem was at issue in L. ex rel. Mr. F. v.
North Haven Board of Education, 352 an LRE case out of Connecticut.
L. suffered from Down syndrome, the same disability as Rafael’s in
Oberti. In class, she was as disruptive as Rafael, acting violently
towards her peers and teachers, and destructive of her peers’ personal
property and school property. 353 One incident involved her throwing a
chair at her teacher. 354 This behavior was triggered only when
academic demands and expectations that arose from the general
education environment were placed on her. 355 While there were times
when L. would behave well in class and get along with others, as soon
as she received instruction, she became disruptive. 356 The court heard
testimony from Area Cooperative Education Services (ACES), 357
which assessed L.’s behavior. 358

351

CJN v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 323 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2003).
624 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Conn. 2009)
353
Id. at 174.
354
Id. at 169.
355
Id.
356
Id.
357
ACES is an organization in Connecticut that provides assistance to school
boards in developing “cost effective programs and services.” AREA COOPERATIVE
EDUCATION SERVICES, http://www.aces.org/about/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 30,
2010). Its purpose is to help school boards improve their education, including special
education. Id.
358
North Haven, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 172.
352
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ACES’ assessment attributed her violent behavior to her
placement in the general education environment. 359 The report
concluded that her disruptive behavior “stemmed from a frustration
about her inability to successfully communicate her feelings and a
desire to escape a potentially punishing situation.” 360 A psychiatrist
hired by L.’s parents attributed her violent behavior to her feelings of
“‘vulnerability associated with her intellectual impairment.’” 361 He
ascribed this vulnerability to L.’s awareness of the “disparity between
herself and her peers” and the fact that as she becomes more aware of
this disparity, she is likely to become more disruptive. 362
The Ross test avoids any result where a panoply of service
providers are enlisted just to ensure that a student is kept in a regular
education environment. By asking whether the school board used
“reasonable measures” to educate a student satisfactorily, the court
defers to administrative and trial court findings. Once findings are
made at the state-level administrative hearing, the reviewing court asks
whether the decision was “rational.” 363 A decision is rational when the
reviewing court determines that the school board used reasonable
measures. 364 In the context of Ross, the court concluded that the
board’s use of three different types of services constituted reasonable
measures. 365 Therefore, the court largely deferred to the school
board’s determinations. Deferring to school boards in this context is
important because schools are in better positions than courts to
evaluate the effect that these services have on students with disabilities
when they are placed in a general education environment. The Oberti
test, by application, puts courts too far into areas that require intimate
knowledge and understanding that only school boards can possess.

359

Id. at 170.
Id.
361
Id.
362
Id.
363
Bd. of Educ. of Twp. Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 278 (7th
Cir. 2007).
364
Id. at 277.
365
Id.
360
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Moreover, the results that the Oberti test creates might propel
stereotypes. As humans, we tend to distinguish “characteristics;”
naturally, therefore, it is human nature to perceive differences in
people, for better or for worse. 366 And when differences become
stigmatizing, any institutionalization of them should be avoided. For
instance, one scholar has observed that American society has
developed in ways that stigmatize disabilities, and she points to one
particular feature of our society that is a seemingly indispensable part
of everyday life: steps. She argues that someone in a wheelchair is
“different only in relation to those who are mobile on foot.” 367 This
difference is significant only because institutions “make this difference
matter” by requiring people in wheelchairs to gain access differently
from people who are not in wheelchairs. 368 This difference can create
a stigma; by eliminating different treatment for people with
disabilities, we as a society can help to eliminate any perceived
differences. 369
Congress had this effect in mind when it enacted the IDEA. As
Oberti noted, mainstreaming teaches “nondisabled children to work
and communicate with children with disabilities,” so as to “eliminate
the stigma, mistrust and hostility” that has been directed towards
people with disabilities. 370 Looking at the language of the IDEA,
however, Congress was aware that for some students, mainstreaming
would be ineffective—hence the term “appropriate education.” 371 If
Congress meant for all students to be included in classrooms, it is
doubtful that it would have chosen such language. The Supreme Court
366

Robyn M. Dawes, The Nature of Human Nature: An Empirical Case for
Withholding Judgment—Perhaps Indefinitely, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 81, 81 (1995) (“We
understand only characteristics of entities or processes. A claim to understanding the
entities or processes themselves is based on an ability to combine our understanding
of their characteristics with sufficient accuracy that we can predict their behavior
with a probability not too distant from certainty.”).
367
See MINOW, supra note 31, at 12.
368
Id.
369
Id.
370
Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d
1204, 1216 n.24 (3d Cir. 1993).
371
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
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recognized the import of this terminology when it remarked, when
referring to the LRE requirement, that Congress understood that
general education environments would not be appropriate for some
students. 372 Arguably, at least, when the application of a federal
appeals court test results in, as the A.S. court determined, the
implementation of over six separate types of services (and as much as
ten, as the A.S. court counted 373 ), just to keep the student included in
the classroom, his placement there may be inappropriate.
This large number of services may actually propel stigmatic
perceptions towards students with disabilities. One student, disabled
enough to require an aide and a special education teacher, but
cognizant enough to articulate his feelings, preferred that his services
be provided outside of the regular classroom because he felt
inferior. 374 If receiving two types of service engendered this
perception, a fortiorari ten types of services could reach the same
result. 375 While A. may have lacked the cognitive ability to articulate
her discomfort with the providers’ presence, students with less severe
disabilities do have the mental capacity to be aware that other students
are not receiving services. 376 The L. court found this dynamic as
well. 377 The more appropriate the placement in a general education
environment, the less stigmatizing the result. Under Ross, school
officials, in touch with students with disabilities every day, have the
ability to make this determination free from any intrusive factor test.

372

Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 181 n.4 (1982).
373
A.S. ex rel. S. v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ. 183 F. Supp. 2d 534, 544 (D. Conn.
2002)
374
Joseph R. Jenkins & Amy Heinen, Students’ Preferences for Service
Delivery: Pull-out, In-Class, or Integrated Models, 55 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 516,
519 (1989).
375
See A.S., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 544.
376
See L. ex rel. Mr. F. v. North Haven Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170
(D. Conn. 2009).
377
Id.
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C. Oberti’s Third Factor
The A.S. court concluded that the school board also failed to
satisfy the third Oberti factor. 378 The third Oberti factor requires
courts to ask what “possible negative effect the child’s inclusion may
have on the education of the other children in the classroom.” 379 It also
requires the courts to consider the effect that additional services would
have on the behavior of a student with a disability. 380 The court
rejected the school board’s evidence that A. had a history of
disruption. 381 The court agreed that the evidence showed some
disruption, but it found that the record did not clearly indicate whether
behavioral problems caused the disruption or negative effects to the
regular education environment. 382 While the court seemed to say that
the student’s behavior would have improved with more services
provided, as the first prong requires, this factor was not a major issue
of contention. 383
While the facts of A.S. do not involve a serious examination of
the third factor, its reliance on the first factor puts the school board in
a disadvantaged position. Conceivably, under Oberti’s reading of the
IDEA, a school board can never argue that a student was too
disruptive for placement in a regular classroom unless it uses all
possible types of services. Thus, a district might not ever satisfy this
factor unless it provides a wealth of services. Congress did not provide
for this result, even though it could have readily done so. By
providing simply that a student with disabilities has to receive
“supplementary aids or services,” and not expressly providing for
“unlimited” or “maximum” supplementary aids or services, Congress’
meaning is vague.
378

A.S., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d
1204, 1217 (3d. Cir. 1993).
380
Id.
381
A.S., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
382
Id.
383
Id.
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Advocates for a presumption of mainstreaming would contend
that this silence should be read in favor of including kids in general
education classrooms, over school boards’ contrary determinations.
Oberti reached this result. 384 However, this reading goes against
Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has long maintained
that when interpreting the breadth of a statute, it should not be read to
“impinge[] upon or pre-empt[] the States’ traditional powers.” 385
Without a “clear and manifest purpose,” the Supreme Court has
refused to give a federal statute an overly intrusive scope. 386 In effect,
the Oberti test, as demonstrated by the result in A.S., intrudes into
traditional realms of state power without relying on express
congressional direction to do so.
While the IDEA provides for federal judicial review, which is
a mechanism to gauge compliance, 387 the Oberti test’s intrusion goes
beyond that grant of power. 388 The Ross test provides for a much more
limited ability to question state action in its traditional realms of
power. Reviewing courts applying Ross will reverse local and state
determinations only when they have clearly violated the IDEA by not
using “reasonable measures” to educate the student with disabilities
satisfactorily. 389 This test ensures that courts do not “impos[e] their
views of preferable educational methods upon the states.” 390 Given
that the IDEA governs education—a responsibility traditionally left to
the states—and that the legislation is silent on the degree of services
that had to be used, a test that imposes upon the states only when there

384

Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219.
Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 345 (1994).
386
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that a
statute will be interpreted to pre-empt the traditional state powers only if that result
is “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress” (quoting Napier v. Atl. Coast Line
R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)).
387
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(2) (2006); see also Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick
Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).
388
See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
389
Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 277
(7th Cir. 2007).
390
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
385
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has been a clear IDEA violation is consistent with the IDEA’s
language and Supreme Court precedent.
CONCLUSION
The purpose behind the IDEA is to provide a meaningful
education for students with disabilities. One component of that
education is placement in an environment that is conducive to
instruction. A reasonableness test is more suitable to achieving this
result because it better accounts for the relevant IDEA language and
applicable Supreme Court precedent. Factor-based tests, as
demonstrated, give the judiciary more scrutinizing authority than
Congress intended. A test that is delicate to determinations that are
sensitive to the peculiar needs of any individual student with a
disability is more appropriate than a factor test that rests on a
presumption of mainstreaming. It is a question of institutional
competence, and as institutions, courts are better left in the courtroom,
while schools are better left in the classroom.
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